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LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The parties to the proceedings below are Plaintiffs/Respondents Ignacio and Esther 
Buenrostro and Defendant/Respondent Whitney A. Nesbitt. Defendant Jacob C. Loveland 
has been dismissed from the case and is not a party to the instant appeal. The Petitioner, 
Intermountain Surgical LLC is not a party to the proceeding below. Intermountain seeks 
extraordinary relief from the District Court's order requiring it to produce proprietary 
documents and 3 O(b )( 6) testimony in response to Defendant/Respondent Whitney A. 
Nesbitt's subpoena duces tecum. 
I,,,>, 
-..:, 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JlJR.ISDICTION ................................................................................................................ 4 
ISSUES FOR MVIE-W .................................................................................................... 4 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND 
RULES ................................................................................................................................ 4 
STATEMENT OF T:HE CASE ........................................................................................ 5 
FACTS ................................................................................................................................ 7 
SUJ.\.11\1.AR.Y OF AR.G~NT ....................................................................................... 12 
ARG~NT .................................................................................................................... 13 
I. The Information Farmers Seeks is Irrelevant and Disproportional to the 
Needs of the Personal Injury Action ................................................................... 13 
A. 
B. 
The District Court erred in its application of Rule 26 when it failed 
to analyze the relevancy of Farmers' subpoena request as relates to 
the parties' claims and defenses ............................................................... 14 
Farmers did not satisfy its burden that the confidential and 
proprietary information that it seeks is proportional discovery .......... 21 
C. Applying the correct legal analysis, the information that Farmers 
seeks is not relevant and proportional ..................................................... 24 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Farmers did not meet its burden in establishing that the 
production of information regarding Intermountain' s licenses 
and accreditations is relevant and proportional.. .............................. 25 
Farmers did not meet its burden that the production of 
information regarding the number of surgeries performed by Dr. 
Huntsman for Intermountain and the fees paid by Intermountain 
to Dr. Huntsman is relevant and proportional .................................. 25 
Farmers did not meet its burden that the production of 
information regarding when, how, and by whom the Plaintiffs 
were referred to lntermountain is relevant and proportional ........... 26 
1 
4. 
5. 
Farmers did not meet its burden that the production of 
information underlying Intermountain' s formula for determining 
its prices is relevant and proportional .............................................. 26 
Farmers did not meet its burden that the production of 
information regarding Intermountain' s qualifications to provide 
expert testimony is relevant or proportional .................................... 2 7 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 27 
ADDENDUM 
1. Order on Non-Party's Motion for Protective Order, Dated May 31, 2017 
2. Decision and Order, Vigueras-Amezcua v. Shoeman, Case No. 160903969, 
Dated January 11, 2017 
3. Protective Order, Vigueras-Amezcua v. Shoeman, Case No. 160903969, 
Dat~d January 16, 2017 
4. Order Granting Motion for Protective Order, Salisbury v. The Living Planet, 
Case No. 130905519, Dated December 14, 2015 
2 
-~ 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Bielar v. Washoe Health Sys., 306 P.3d 360 (Nev. 2013) ................................................. 16 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. Talford, 727 S.E.2d 866 (N.C. 2012) ................. 15 
Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255 (Utah 1997) .................................................. 15, 22, 23 
Express Recovery Servs. v. Reuling, 2015 UT App 299,364 P.3d 766 ...................... 15, 17 
Jones v. Mackey Price Thompson & Ostler, 2015 UT 60, 355 P.3d 1000 .................. 15, 17 
Kunz v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp. & Health Care Ctrs., 869 N.E.2d 328 (Ill. Ct. App. 
2007) .............................................................................................................................. 16 
Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, 67 P.3d 1017 ......................................................... 14 
Shaffer v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 4th 993, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 506 (1995) ................ 18 
State v. Ashby, 2015 UT App 169, 357 P.3d 554 ................................................................ 4 
Wilson v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2012 UT 43,289 P.3d 369 .................................................... 20 
XPO Logistics Freight, Inc. v. YRC, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165323, 2016 WL 
6996275 ......................................................................................................................... 13 
Statutes 
U.C.A. 78A-4-103 ................................................................................................................ 4 
Other Authorities 
Restatement 2d of Torts, § 911 .......................................................................................... 16 
Rules 
U.R.A.P. 19 .......................................................................................................................... 4 
U.R.C.P. 26 ................................................................................................................. passim 
U.R.C.P. 45 .................................................................................................................. 13, 21 
U.R.E. 401 ......................................................................................................................... 14 
3 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code sections 78A-4-103(1), 78A-4-
103(2)G), and UtahR App. P. 19. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: Whether the District Court correctly interpreted and determined the 
relevancy and proportionality standard of Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b) with respect to discovery 
requests to a non-party to the litigation? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews the application and interpretation 
of a rule of procedure for correctness. State v. Ashby, 2015 UT App 169, ,r 18, 357 P.3d 
554. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in the District Court, see Order, 
attached as Addendum I. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES 
(b) Discovery scope. 
(b )(1) In general. Parties may discover any matter, not privileged, which is 
relevant to the claim or defense of any party if the discovery satisfies the standards of 
proportionality set forth below. Privileged matters that are not discoverable or admissible 
in any proceeding of any kind or character include all information in any form provided 
during and created specifically as part of a request for an investigation, the investigation, 
findings, or conclusions of peer review, care review, or quality assurance processes of 
any organization of health care providers as defined in the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act for the purpose of evaluating care provided to reduce morbidity and mortality or to 
improve the quality of medical care, or for the purpose of peer review of the ethics, 
competence, or professional conduct of any health care provider. 
(b)(2) Proportionality. Discovery and discovery requests are proportional if: 
4 
(b)(2)(A) the discovery is reasonable, considering the needs of the case, the 
amount in controversy, the complexity of the case, the parties' resources, the 
importance of the issues, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the 
issues; 
(b )(2)(B) the likely benefits of the proposed discovery outweigh the burden 
or expense; 
(b)(2)(C) the discovery is consistent with the overall case management and 
will further the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the case; 
(b)(2)(D) the discovery is not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative; 
(b)(2)(E) the information cannot be obtained from another source that is 
more convenient, less burdensome or less expensive; and 
(b)(2)(F) the party seeking discovery has not had sufficient opportunity to 
obtain the information by discovery or otherwise, taking into account the parties' 
relative access to the information. 
(b )(3) Burden. The party seeking discovery always has the burden of showing 
proportionality and relevance. To ensure proportionality, the court may enter orders 
under Rule 3 7. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case, course of proceeding, and disposition below 
This petition arises from the District Court's denial of Petitioner Intermountain 
Surgical, LLC's ("Intermountain") motion for a protective order related to the discovery of 
confidential proprietary business information. (6/1/17 Order on Non-Party's Motion for 
Protective Order ("Order"), attached as addendum 1. )1 This Order contradicts two other 
district court orders granting Intermountain a protective order over the same information. 
(3/8/17 Memo iso Motion for Protective Order ("Memo"), pp. iv-v.) 
1 The record from the District Court has not been forwarded to this Court for purposes of 
appeal. Counsel was directed by the Clerk of the Court to cite to the record by docket 
entry date and name of document. 
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Plaintiffs, Ignacio Buenrostro and Esther Buenrostro, brought this action against 
defendants Whitney Nesbitt and Jacob Loveland for personal injuries sustained in an auto 
accident. (3/30/16 Complaint.) Intennountain is not a party to this litigation. (Id.) 
Intermountain' s involvement in the case was limited to providing estimates for surgeries 
contemplated by the Plaintiffs back in 2014. (Memo, p. ii.) Intennountain is aware that Dr. 
Kade T. Huntsman consulted with each of the Plaintiffs about future surgery in December 
of 2014. (Id.) Intermountain has not been involved with any treatment or surgeries that the 
Plaintiffs may have had since December 2014. Likewise, Intermountain has no lien or 
contract with the Plaintiffs. (Id.) 
Under the guise of defending this lawsuit, Defendant's insurance carrier Farmers 
Insurance ("Farmers") directed its appointed attorneys to serve a 30(b)(6) notice to 
Intermountain, with the express intent of obtaining confidential proprietary, business 
information. (Memo at Ex. 1.) Intermountain moved the court for a protective order, 
arguing that the information sought was proprietary trade secrets and/or did not meet the 
proportionality test under Rule 26. (Id., pp. 1-8.) The District Court denied Intermountain's 
motion and ordered that Intermountain produce various proprietary documents and 30(b )( 6) 
testimony. See Order. futerrnountain filed a petition for extraordinary relief from the 
District Court's order. The Court requested further briefmg from the parties on 
Intermountain' s petition. 
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FACTS 
Background Facts 
futermountain is an entity that facilitates surgical treatment for patients who do not 
have health insurance. fu so doing, futermountain leases a surgical suite from Canyon Crest 
Surgical Center. Intermountain owns and maintains all of the surgical equipment used for 
these surgeries at its own expense. Intermountain is responsible for the acquisition and 
purchase of the surgical supplies, surgical implants and hardware used in these surgeries 
and does so through its own efforts via negotiation of contracted rates. (See Memo, pp. ii, 2-
5; id. at Ex. 11, p. 3; id. at Ex. 23, pp. 12-14.) 
In cases where futermountain actually provides its services to patients, each of the 
surgeries performed include "professional fees" and "facilities fees." (Memo at Ex. 11 pp. 
3-4; id. at Ex. 24 ,r,r 7-8.) The professional fees are those charged by the medical 
professionals such as surgeons, anesthesiologists and physician's assistants. (Id. at Ex. 24, 
,r,r 6-8.) The medical professionals who provide medical services are independent 
contractors. (Id. at Ex. 11, p. 4.) There are several surgeons in the area who perform 
surgeries for futermountain patients. These surgeons and other professionals bill 
Intermountain directly. futermountain pays the medical professionals for the services 
rendered without reduction. Intermountain includes the fees paid for medical professional 
services in a statement that includes "CPT" codes. (Id., at p. 2; id at Ex. 24, ,r,r 6-8; id. at 
Ex. 23, pp. 12-13.) futermountain charges the patient exactly what the medical 
professionals charge futennountain, with no "up charge." 
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Intermountain is not a medical professional and therefore does not charge 
professional fees. However, Intermountain is a facilities provider and charges a facility fee. 
(Id., Ex. 24 ,,r 7-8; id. at Ex. 23, pp. 12-13.) Intermountain's invoices to patients include 
facility fees and CPT codes that are similar to the facility fees charged by other facility 
providers. (Id., p. 2.) These charges include the use of the surgical suite, equipment, 
surgical supplies and surgical implants/hardware used in these surgeries. (Id., Ex. 24, ,r,r 7-
8, 11, 19; id. at Ex. 11, p. 3-4; id. at Ex. 17, p. 1.) Intermountain considers the pricing 
analysis it has performed and continues to perform to be proprietary trade secrets, research, 
development and commercial information, which if disclosed would prejudice its ongoing 
business efforts. (Memo, pp. 1-8.) 
When Intermountain provides services to patients, Intermountain and the patient 
enter into a lien agreement wherein Intermountain agrees to accept deferred payment of the 
charges for medical and facilities services until after a patient receives a recovery by way of 
settlement or verdict. However, even if there is no recovery, the patient is responsible for 
payment. (Id. at Ex. 11, p. 3.) 
The foregoing is what occurs when Intermountain provides its services to patients. 
However, in this case Intermountain did not provide any services to the plaintiffs. (Memo, 
p. ii.) Intermountain has not paid any medical professionals or provided facilities services 
for either Plaintiff. (Id.) Intermountain did not enter into any contractual agreements with 
the plaintiffs and Intermountain has no lien rights. (Id.) Intermountain's only involvement 
in this case occurred in December of 2014. At that time, Intermountain was approached by 
Plaintiffs' counsel for a surgical referral. Intermountain provided Plaintiffs with a referral 
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to Dr. Huntsman, an orthopedic surgeon who practices at the Salt Lake Orthopedic Clinic. 
Plaintiffs presented to Dr. Huntsman at the Salt Lake Orthopedic Clinic on December 15, 
2014, for a medical consultation. (Id.) Thereafter, on December 18, 2014, Plaintiffs' 
counsel asked Intennountain to provide estimates for what the costs would be if the 
Plaintiffs decided to undergo the surgeries recommended by Dr. Huntsman. As requested, 
Intennountain provided the estimates to Plaintiffs' counsel. These were simple estimates 
and did not include CPT codes that would normally be on an actual statement for services. 
(Id., p. ii; id., Ex. 2.) After December 18, 2014, Intennountain had no additional 
involvement with the Plaintiffs, their attorney or anyone else associated with the case until 
November 11, 2016, when Farmers served a subpoena upon Intennountain for the 
Plaintiffs' medical records. (Id., p. ii.) 
Petitioner responded to Farmers' subpoena in this case by producing the medical 
records it had with respect to the Plaintiffs. (Id. at Ex. 2.) These records consisted of Dr. 
Huntsman's report and the estimates of the costs of the recommended surgeries. (Id.) 
Thereafter, Farmers served a Rule 30(b )(6) deposition notice upon Intermountain. The Rule 
30(b)(6) notice gave notice of an obvious attempt by Farmers to obtain confidential 
proprietary business information and processes including Intennountain's internal records 
and analysis of profit, overhead, studies and subscriptions purchased by Intermountain, 
analysis and processes developed by Intermountain, and other trade secrets. (See Order.) In 
addition, Farmers gave notice that it would require Intennountain to identify expert 
qualifications of its employees who would provide expert testimony in the instant case. 
(Id.) 
9 
After receiving Fanners' Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice, futermountain filed a 
Motion for Protective Order. (See Memo.) Intermountain argued that Farmers could not 
meet its burden of showing that the requested information was relevant and proportional 
pursuant to Rule 26(b) as amended in 2011. Additionally, Intennountain argued that the 
information was confidential proprietary business information, processes and trade secrets 
pursuant to Utah Code § 13-24-2. (Id.) Finally, Intermountain argued that it has not been 
designated as an expert and has already represented that it is not qualified as an expert. 
Intermountain has no intention of testifying as an expert in this, or any other litigation. 
(3/22/17 Reply Memo in Support of Protective Order, p. 8.) 
Despite the fact that Intermountain did not provide services to the Plaintiffs, did not 
have a contract/lien agreement with the Plaintiffs, and had only provided a referral and 
estimates to the Plaintiffs, Farmers argued that "[b ]ecause Petitioner will obtain a lien on the 
[Plaintiffs'] recovery in this litigation to finance the surgery proposed by Dr. Huntsman it 
has a strong incentive or bias to testify that the charges are reasonable and customary." (See 
3/15/17 Defense Memorandum in Response to futermountain Surgical Motion for 
Protective Order, p. 11.) In other words, even though the Plaintiffs have not had surgery, 
because they might have surgery sometime in the future, it argued Intermountain might be 
the provider. Based upon this non-existent hypothetical scenario, Farmers claimed 
entitlement to unprecedented access to Intermountain's confidential proprietary business 
information, processes and trade secrets. 
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After the May 9, 2017, telephonic hearing on Intennountain's Motion for Protective 
Order, the District Court granted Farmers' request and required Intennountain to produce its 
confidential proprietary business information, processes and trade secrets. (See Order.) 
This is not the frrst time that liability carriers have attempted to obtain 
Intennountain' s confidential data, but it is the first time that a court has interpreted Rule 26 
to require its production. In Vigueras-Amezcua v. Shoeman, Farmers attempted to obtain 
substantially the same information. Intennountain filed a Motion for Protective Order, 
which was heard by Judge Bates on December 8, 2016. In his January 11, 2017, order, 
Judge Bates significantly limited the scope of Farmers' inquiry and entered a strict 
Protective Order. See Decision and Order, Vigueras-Amezcua v. Shoeman, No. 160903969 
(January 11, 2017), attached as addendum 2, and Protective Order, Vigueras-Amezcua v. 
Shoeman, No. 160903969 (January 16, 2017), attached as addendum 3. Prior to the 
Vigueras-Amezcua case, Intennountain had a similar experience with another liability 
insurance company in Salisbury v. The Living Planet. In Salisbury, Judge Scott granted 
Petitioner's Motion for Protective Order. See Intermountain Surgical' s Order Granting 
Motion for Protective Order, Salisbury v. The Living Planet, No. 130905519 (December 14, 
2015), attached as addendum 4. In this case, the District Court diverged from the 
interpretations of Judge Bates and Judge Scott and granted Farmers unprecedented and 
expansive access to Intermountain' s confidential proprietary business information, 
processes and trade secrets. (See Order.) 
11 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A protective order is necessary to prevent Farmers' ongoing disproportionate 
discovery requests aimed at obtaining irrelevant, confidential, proprietary and protected 
information from Intermountain. Under Rule 26(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
before a discovery request is initiated, the matters sought must be: (1) relevant to a "claim 
or defense" and (2) proportional to the needs of the case. In this case, the District Court 
failed to properly apply Rule 26. 
First, Rule 26 requires that discovery be relevant to a "claim or defense." Farmers 
argued its request was relevant to Plaintiffs' future medical expenses. Under Utah law, 
future medical expenses are determined by the price that those services sell for in the 
marketplace. However, instead of analyzing whether Farmers' discovery request was 
relevant to determining the reasonable value of Plaintiffs' medical expenses, the District 
Court analyzed the relevancy of the discovery as pertains to questions that are not even at 
issue in this case. 
Second, Rule 26 requires the request to be proportional to the needs of the case. 
This element analyzes whether the information sought is important to a parties' claim or 
defense, and whether the same or similar information can be obtained from another 
source. As stated above, Farmers claims to need information from lntermountain to 
determine/dispute the reasonable value of Plaintiffs' future surgical expenses. However, 
the information that Farmers seeks (including, among other things, Intermountain's 
profit-margins, contracts, business model, etc.) is not important to determining the 
reasonable value of future medical expenses and Farmers admits its expert can testify 
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regarding the value and necessity of those expenses. In this case, the District Court did 
not analyze whether the information requested is important to calculating Plaintiffs' 
future surgical expenses. Nor did it analyze whether Farmers could obtain information 
regarding the value and necessity of future surgical expenses from another source. 
Instead, the District Court appeared to analyze whether Intermountain' s proprietary 
information could be, without great burden, obtained from another source. That analysis 
is error on its face. If that were the test, proprietary information would always be 
discoverable. 
Applying the correct legal analysis, the information that Farmers requested, and 
that the District Court ordered to be produced, was not discoverable under Rule 26. 
Intermountain therefore requests that the District Court's Order be reversed and that it be 
directed to grant Intermountain's motion for a protective order. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
The Information Farmers Seeks is Irrelevant and Disproportional to the 
Needs of the Personal Injury Action. 
Farmers subpoena request to Intermountain seeks information that is irrelevant and 
disproportional to the determination of the Plaintiffs' future medical damages. "It is well 
established that the scope of discovery under a subpoena is the same as the scope of 
discovery under Rule 26(b)." XPO Logistics Freight, Inc. v. YRC, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 165323, *10, 2016 WL 6996275; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 45 Advisory 
Committee Notes ( equating a subpoena to discovery). Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure outlines the scope of permissible discovery. Under this rule, "[p ]arties 
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may discover any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the claim or defense of any 
party if the discovery satisfies the standards of proportionality." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l). 
Thus, to be discoverable under Utah R. Civ. P. 26, the information sought must be ( 1) 
relevant to any party's "claim or defense" and (2) proportional to the needs of the case. 
The Rule further provides that "the party seeking discovery always has the burden of 
showing proportionality and relevance." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). In this case, the 
District Court misapplied the test set forth in Rule 26. The information sought by 
Farmers is neither relevant nor proportional to the needs of the parties in this case. 
A. The District Court erred in its application of Rule 26 when it failed to 
analyze the relevancy of Farmers' subpoena request as relates to the 
parties' claims and defenses. 
The district court abused its discretion because it failed to properly determine 
whether the information sought by Farmers was relevant to any "claim or defense" set 
forth in this case. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l). Relevant evidence is evidence that "has any 
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and 
the fact is of consequence of determining the action." Utah R. Evid. 401. The only claim 
asserted by Plaintiffs against Defendant is for negligence. (See Complaint.) The elements 
of negligence are well known: duty, breach causation, and damages. Rose v. Provo City, 
2003 UT App 77, ~ 7, 67 P.3d 1017. 
Farmers argued that the discovery it seeks is relevant to the issue of damages (i.e, 
the amount and necessity of Plaintiffs' future surgeries). However, Farmers did not 
demonstrate below and the District Court did not analyze how Intermountain' s business 
information (including, among other things profit margins, contracts, costs, risk 
14 
assessment, and business/plans) is relevant to determining the reasonable amount of the 
Plaintiffs' future surgical expenses. See, e.g., Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255 (Utah 
1997) (reversing district court's decision regarding protective order when court failed to 
properly analyze whether the information sought was pertinent to the actual issue in the 
case.) 
Under Utah law, the reasonableness of a plaintiffs medical expenses is 
determined by the price those services sell for in the marketplace as demonstrated by 
comparing the prices of what other providers charge for the same services in the 
community. This determination is not made based on a specific provider's profit margin, 
contracts, overhead, lease payments, rent, etc. See, e.g., Jones v. Mackey Price 
Thompson & Ostler, 2015 UT 60, 1 58, 355 P.3d 1000 (holding that, in cases of 
professional services, the reasonable value of those services normally equates to the 
market value of those services); Express Recovery Servs. v. Reuling, 2015 UT App 299, 
11 14-15, 364 P.3d 766 (the proper measure of damages for professional services is the 
reasonable value of those services in the marketplace). 
Other jurisdictions similarly hold that the value of medical services is determined 
based upon the price those services sell for in the relevant community. See Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. Talford, 727 S.E.2d 866, 870 (N.C. 2012) ("[I]t is 
appropriate when determining what a service is 'reasonably worth' to look to 'the time 
and labor expended, skill, knowledge and experience involved, and other attendant 
circumstances, rather than . . . the benefit to the person for whom the services are 
rendered. Those 'other attendant circumstances' include the rates charged by similar 
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market participants in similar geographic areas to perform similar work at the relevant 
time." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Kunz v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp. 
& Health Care Ctrs., 869 N.E.2d 328, 337-338 (Ill. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the 
reasonable amount of medical expenses is determined by the "customary charges for 
services in a similar geographic area in which the services are provided"); Bielar v. 
Washoe Health Sys., 306 P.3d 360 (Nev. 2013) (granting summary judgment against 
party who attempted to prove the unreasonableness of medical expenses by the cost-plus 
method (cost plus reasonable mark-up) because the value of medical services is 
determined by the price those services sell for in the marketplace, not by profit margin); 
Restatement 2d of Torts, § 911 (price of services is determined by the price those services 
sell for in the marketplace). 2 
One need only look to other institutions to show the fallacy of Farmers' argument 
that Intermountain's business information is somehow relevant to any determination in 
this case. For example IHC, St. Marks/Mountain Star, IASIS, University of Utah 
Hospital, as well as other outpatient surgical centers are legal entities/corporations. They 
own and/or lease buildings and facilities and are "facilities" which charge facilities fees 
with the proper CPT coding. They equip those facilities so that medical care providers 
can provide medical care to patients. They arrange medical care for patients by way of 
their employees as well as independent contractors who are qualified medical 
2 Generally, if Intermountain contracts to perform services for patients the invoice that is 
provided by Intermountain to the patients identifies the services provided, the CPT codes 
and the charges for the services provided. This information, along with the Plaintiffs' 
medical records provides all the necessary information required for Farmers to perform 
its own analysis of whether charges are reasonable and customary. 
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professionals. They charge patients for use of the facilities they own or lease. They also 
charge for medical care provided by qualified medical care providers. It goes without 
saying that their medical charges include profit. Otherwise, they would go out of 
business.3 ~ 
If IHC, St. Marks/Mountain Star, IASIS, University of Utah Hospital, or others 
similarly situated were on the receiving end of subpoenas and 30(b)(6) notices similar to 
those served by Farmers in this and other cases, these entities would inevitably respond 
the same way as Intermountain has. It would be surprising if a court allowed Farmers to 
delve into IHC's or St. Marks contractual relationships with medical care personnel or 
vendors because the information is irrelevant/inadmissible, confidential, and proprietary 
business information. Likewise, it would be beyond the pale to require IHC or St. Marks 
to disclose how much they paid for overhead, supplies, equipment, employees, 
independent contractors, etc.4 
Another example outside of the medical context is the method generally employed 
to determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees. Compare Express Recovery Servs., 
2015 UT App 299 ( determining value of medical services based on price services sell for 
in the marketplace) with Jones, 2015 UT 60 (determining value of legal services based on 
price of services in the marketplace). In determining the reasonableness of attorney's 
3 Farmers is a "for profit" enterprise and presumably makes a profit. Otherwise, Farmers 
would not be able to justify retaining two law offices in different states to defend a 
relatively uncomplicated personal injury case. 
4 On several occasions Intermountain has requested that Farmers identify other cases 
where it has burdened providers like IHC, St. Marks or other surgical centers in Utah 
with the same intrusive discovery. However, to date, Farmers has not responded with 
even one example. 
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fees, courts look to what other attorneys of like experience charge for similar services in 
similar cases. Jones, 2015 UT 60. Courts do not delve into the law firm's books to see 
how much they pay their employees or independent contractors, how much they pay for 
their computers, how much they pay for office space, or whether they lease or own their 
copy machines. As one court noted, engaging in such an analysis would present myriad 
problems and result in the unnecessary analysis and presentation of evidence that is 
beyond what is needed to determine the reasonableness of a fee: 
Is every single item of cost incurred by a firm (e.g., both capital 
expenditures and costs of operations) to be part of the calculation? What 
special rules must be adopted in order to avoid punishing law firm 
efficiency or a firm's skill or luck in negotiating favorable leases or vendor 
contracts? Is every single item of revenue received by a firm to be included 
in the calculation (e.g., what about investment income)? How will the 
quality of the legal services be incorporated into the analysis? What about 
other intangibles, like professional reputation and goodwill? Will the firm 
be forced to disclose the compensation it pays to every lawyer and staff 
member? Will it be forced to disclose the amounts it pays for office space, 
equipment, supplies, furniture or utilities? Will it be forced to disclose the 
individuals or entities to whom it makes these payments? What portion of 
the attorney's overall costs of doing business should be allocated to the 
particular case in which the fee dispute arises? 
Shaffer v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 4th 993, 1001, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 506 (1995). 
Instead of analyzing whether the discovery sought by Farmers is relevant to the 
reasonableness and necessity of Plaintiffs' future medical expenses, Farmers persuaded 
the District Court to "go off into the weeds" so to speak and analyze the relevancy of the 
discovery sought as pertains to questions that are not even pertinent in this case. 
Specifically, the Court held that Fanners was entitled to Intermountain's proprietary 
business information because this information was relevant to the determination of: 
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(1) Whether Intennountain is a medical provider or a collateral 
source provider (i.e., someone who pays for medical services), 
(2) the factual foundation for the estimated cost of surgery that was 
provided by Intermountain to determine whether the estimate represents 
reasonable or customary charges or collateral source payments that might 
be made; and 
(3) the contractual relationship between Intermountain and 
Plaintiffs' expert (Dr. Huntsman), who has been designated to provide 
testimony regarding the value of Plaintiffs' future surgeries. (Order, p. 2.) 
That is not the correct legal analysis. Under Rule 26, the District Court was 
required to analyze the relevancy of the information sought as relates to the claims and 
defenses made in this case. As described above, the only claim or defense Farmers 
identified was the future surgical damages claimed by the Plaintiffs. The court, therefore, 
should have analyzed the test for determining future medical expenses under Utah law 
and then analyzed whether the information sought would resolve that issue. By deviating 
from the correct legal analysis, the District Court focused on the resolution of three issues 
that are not even pertinent to this case. 
The first two issues identified by the District Court relate to the determination of 
whether Intermountain is a medical provider or a collateral source provider. But what 
does that matter? Intermountain's status is not in dispute in this case. Intermouata.in has 
not provided any services to the Plaintiffs (medical or collateral). Nor does 
Intermountain have a contract to provide any services for the Plaintiffs. Intennountain 
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has already disclosed all documents contained in its files as relates to the Plaintiffs. The 
only information it has regarding this case is a surgical estimate that it provided in 2014. 
Farmers' speculation that Intermountain "might" provide some services in the future does 
not provide a basis under Rule 26 for it to go on a "fishing expedition" through 
Intermountain' s proprietary business records so that it can defend an issue that is not even 
being litigated in this case. Moreover, it is unclear how determining the status of 
Interrnountain is helpful in determining the marketprice for surgical services in the 
community. 
The third issue-the contractual relationship between Dr. Huntsman and 
Intermountain-is also not being litigated in this case. Moreover, as stated above, there 
is no contract to provide medical services to the Plaintiffs. If Farmers means to imply 
that Dr. Huntsman's opinions of what is "reasonable and customary" are skewed because 
he allegedly charges and is paid more than is customary in the industry, Farmers should 
dispute Dr. Huntsman's testimony with relevant evidence (i.e., prices charged for similar 
services in the community).5 
5 Although not at issue in this case, Farmers admits that Intermountain's financial 
relationship with its clients likely constitutes a collateral source. (3/15/17 Defense 
Memorandum in Response, p. 6.) Other Utah district courts have similarly held that the 
financial relationship between Intermountain and its clients constitutes irrelevant 
collateral source information. See addendums 2-4. The Utah Supreme Court has 
likewise held that "[h]ow a plaintiff satisfies his medical expense obligations presents a 
separate issue that is irrelevant to the calculation of his damages." Wilson v. IHC Hasps., 
Inc., 2012 UT 43,138,289 P.3d 369. 
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B. Farmers did not satisfy its burden that the confidential and 
proprietary information that it seeks is proportional discovery. 
The District Court also failed to properly apply the proportionality test outlined in 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b). Rule 26(b)(2) outlines that discovery requests are 
proportional if: 
(b)(2)(A) the discovery is reasonable, considering the needs of the case, the 
amount in controversy, the complexity of the case, the parties' resources, 
the importance of the issues, and the importance of the discovery in 
resolving the issues; 
(b)(2)(B) the likely benefits of the proposed discovery outweigh the burden 
or expense; 
(b)(2)(C) the discovery is consistent with the overall case management and 
will further the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the case; 
(b )(2)(D) the discovery is not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative; 
(b )(2)(E) the information cannot be obtained from another source that is 
more convenient, less burdensome or less expensive; and 
(b)(2)(F) the party seeking discovery has not had sufficient opportunity to 
obtain the information by discovery or otherwise, taking into account the 
parties' relative access to the information. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2). 
The theme underlying all of these factors is that there must be a legitimate need 
for the information requested based on the claims and defenses in the case and that the 
party cannot obtain the same information from another source that is more convenient, 
less burdensome, or less expensive. See also Utah R. Civ. P. 45(e)(5) (stating that only 
"[i]f the party or attorney responsible for issuing the subpoena shows a substantial need 
for the information that cannot be met without undue hardship, the court may order 
compliance upon specified conditions.") 
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The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Chatterton, 938 P.2d 255, is useful in 
demonstrating the correct application of the proportionality test. In that case, the plaintiff 
sought to discover the following from his insurance carrier: the "(1) complete case file 
information on cases involving specified circumstances similar to Chatterton's accident 
and injuries, (2) comprehensive information on [the insurer's] policies and procedures for 
handling uninsured motorist claims, and (3) detailed information on all internal aspects of 
the insurer's processing of Chatterton's claim from its insurance carrier." Id. at 262. The 
plaintiff argued that he needed this information to prove the elements of liability and 
damages as relates to his personal injury claim. Plaintiff also argued that he could not 
obtain the same information from another source. The district court agreed. On appeal, 
the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court noted that, under Utah law, liability 
and the amount and necessity of a plaintiffs damages is dependent upon the unique 
circumstances of each case. The court held that information regarding the insurer's 
policies and procedures and what the insurer paid on claims for similar injuries was 
therefore not important to resolve the issue of damages or liability. The court further held 
that the plaintiff could obtain information regarding the amount of his damages from an 
expert. 
Here, the District Court failed to properly analyze (1) the importance and need for 
the information sought as compared to (2) the burden imposed upon Intermountain. 
First, even assuming that Intermountain' s proprietary information is somehow relevant, 
which it is not, this information is not important or needed to determine or dispute the 
amount or necessity of damages in this case. As described above, delving through 
22 
Intermountain' s proprietary records regarding its charges, payments, contracts, costs, and 
other pricing information will provide little, to no help, determining the necessity or 
market price for the plaintiffs' future medical expenses. Additionally, Farmers has the 
ability, and almost unlimited resources, to have a third party review the charges based 
upon CPT codes as well as Farmers' own internal data bases. Indeed, Farmers has 
already obtained the information relevant to this determination from another source, and 
admits that its expert will testify that Plaintiffs' future surgeries are not necessary and the 
amount plaintiffs' expert is asserting for those surgeries is excessive compared to the 
amount typically charged in the community. (3/15/17 Defense Memorandum m 
Response to Intermountain Surgical Motion for Protective Order, pp. 3-6.)6 
Second, the burden on Intermountain in providing this information 1s not 
insignificant. Intermountain will be forced to divert resources from its business 
operations so that it can gather the requested information, meet with its attorneys to 
ensure that its proprietary information is properly marked and protected, prepare the 
30(b)(6) witness to be knowledgeable about the relevant subject matter, hire an attorney 
to attend the deposition, and incur expenses sending its employee and attorney to attend 
the deposition. The nature of the request is also highly intrusive. Much of the 
information sought is proprietary business information. The District Court did not hold 
otherwise. Moreover, the District Court ordered that Intermountain's proprietary 
6 Chatterton was decided prior to the 2011 amendments to Rule 26. The current version 
of the Rule anticipates that the Court will take a more active role in determining the 
relevancy and proportionality of discovery and places the burden of proving both 
elements on the party seeking the discovery. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b) and Advisory 
Committee Notes. 
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information be released to the in-house attorneys for Farmers-a company that 
Intermountain views as its adversary and that, in Intermountain's view, has attempted to 
violate protective orders pertaining to Intennountain in the past. (See Memo, Ex. 23 
(Motion for Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt).) 
Although unclear, the District Court appears to have held that the request for 
Intermountain's proprietary information is proportional because Farmers could not obtain 
(without great burden) this information from another source. (See Order, p. 2.) That 
reasoning is error on its face. If that were the test, proprietary inf onnation would always 
be discoverable. Of course Farmers could not obtain Intermountain' s proprietary 
information from another source and for good reason-it is proprietary. That is not the 
test. The appropriate inquiry is whether Farmers can obtain the information it needs to 
determine/defend the reasonable value of Plaintiffs' future medical expenses. Farmers 
already demonstrated that it can. The District Court erred in holding otherwise, and this 
Court should reverse. 
C. Applying the correct legal analysis, the information that Farmers seeks 
is not relevant and proportional. 
As described above, the District Court misapplied Rule 26. Pursuant to this Rule, 
the District Court should have analyzed whether the information requested was relevant 
to determining the reasonable amount of Plaintiffs' future surgical expenses (i.e., the 
price for the surgery in the marketplace). Then, if this threshold burden was met, the 
District Court should have analyzed whether Farmers could have obtained the 
information from another source that was less burdensome, costly, or convenient. 
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Applying the correct legal analysis, it is clear that Farmers did not meet its burden as 
relates to each of the items that the District Court ordered to be produced: 
1. Farmers did not meet its burden in establishing that the production of 
information regarding Intermountain' s licenses and accreditations is 
relevant and proportional: 
Intennountain' s licenses and accreditations are not relevant to determining what 
the market price is for a future surgical procedure. (Order, p. 4, 'if'il 1-3.) The market 
price is determined by the prices charged in the community. Supra, pp. 14-17. Farmers 
can determine the market price through the use of an expert. 
2. Farmers did not meet its burden that the production of information 
regarding the number of surgeries performed by Dr. Huntsman for 
Intermountain and the fees paid by Intermountain to Dr. Huntsman is 
relevant and proportional. 
The number of surgeries performed by Dr. Huntsman for Intermountain and the 
total fees charged associated with those surgeries is not relevant to determining the 
market price of Plaintiffs' future medical expenses. (Order, p. 4, 'if'il 4-5.) The market 
price is determined by comparing the prices charged in the community. Supra, pp. 14-17. 
Additionally, the prices associated with other peoples' surgeries, does not equate to the 
necessity or price of the Plaintiffs' surgeries which depends on the Plaintiffs' unique 
circumstances. Moreover, the parties in this case can obtain information regarding the 
reasonable amount and necessity of Plaintiffs' surgeries through expert testimony. 
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3. Farmers did not meet its burden that the production of information 
regarding when, how. and by whom the Plaintiffs were referred to 
Intermountain is relevant and proportional. 
Who, when, and how Intermountain was referred to Plaintiffs is irrelevant in the 
resolution of the amount or degree of Plaintiffs' damages, which is determined by the 
price of the particular surgical service in the marketplace. (See Order, p. 4, ,r,r 6-7.) 
Intermountain has not provided or been contracted to provide· any surgical services for 
Plaintiffs. Farmers can obtain information regarding the reasonable amount of Plaintiffs' 
surgeries through expert testimony. 
4. Farmers did not meet its burden that the production of information 
underlying Intermountain' s formula for determining its prices is 
relevant and proportional. 
Intermountain' s proprietary information for determining its prices is not relevant 
to Plaintiffs' future damages. (Id., p. 4-6, ,r,r 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15.) Plaintiffs' future 
damages are determined by the surgical procedure they are to receive ( as determined by a 
medical doctor) and the price of that procedure in the marketplace. Intermountain has not 
provided or been contracted to provide surgical services to Plaintiffs. Although 
Intermountain might be considered a market player, it does not constitute the 
"marketplace" for surgical services. Moreover, lntermountain has not been designated as 
an expert in this case, is not qualified as an expert, and has no intention of testifying as an 
expert. Therefore, Intermountain' s opinions regarding what is "reasonable and 
customary" or its opinions regarding what documents would be important for such a 
determination is not relevant or admissible. Finally, Farmers has not demonstrated a 
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need for this information. Farmers can determine what is "reasonable and customary" 
through expert testimony 
5. Fanners did not meet its burden that the production of information 
regarding Intennountain's qualifications to provide expert testimony 
is relevant or proportional. 
Intermountain has not been designated as an expert and has already represented to 
the District Court and to the parties in this case that it is not qualified as an expert and has 
no intention of providing any expert testimony. (Id., p. 5, 11 10-11.) Intermountain 
should not have to attend a 30(b)(6) deposition to reiterate the same. 
The District Court abused its discretion and improperly denied Intermountain's 
request for a protective order. As such, Intermountain respectfully requests that this 
Court grant its petition for extraordinary relief and direct the District Court to issue a 
protective order prohibiting Farmers from seeking additional information that has not 
already been produced either by way of production of documents or through 30(b)(6) 
depositions. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant IntermoW1tain's petition for 
extraordinary relief, reverse the decision of the District Court, and direct the District 
Court to issue a protective order prohibiting Farmers from seeking additional information 
from Intermountain. 
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• 
DATED this 24th day of October, 2017. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Karra J. Porter 
Scott T. Evans 
Kristen C. K.iburtz 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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Addendum 1 
Order 
May 31, 2017 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial Dlstrict 
JU~ 
IN TIIE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STAffi-AF ey-
Clelt 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IGNACIO BUENROSTRO and ESTHER 
BUENROSTRO, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WHITNEY A. NESBITT and JACOB C. 
LOVELAND, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON NON-PARTY'S MOTION 
FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Civil No. 160902137 
Judge Royal I. Hansen 
This matter came on for a telephone hearing on Tuesday, May 9, 2017, on a Motion for 
Protective Order filed by non-party Intermountain Surgical, LLC ("IMS").1 Plaintiffs' counsel, 
Brett R. Boulton, Flickinger, Sutterfield & Boulton did not participate. Defendants were 
represented by Gary L. Cooper of Cooper & Larsen; and IMS was represented by Scott Evans of 
Christensen & Jensen. Following the May 9 hearing, the Court requested counsel for IMS and 
counsel for Defendants to prepare and simultaneously submit proposed orders for consideration. 
Both parties filed Proposed Orders in accordance with the Court's Order on or about May 16, 
2017. The Court, having fully reviewed all relevant pleadings and law to the Motion for 
Protective Order, having considered the argument of counsel and having now been fully 
informed, orders as follows . 
. 
Rule 26(b) allows discovery of any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to a claim or 
defense of any party if the discovery satisfies the standards of proportionality. The disputed 
1 IMS included a request for attorney fees in their Motion for Protective Order. Based on the Court's decision, 
outlined infra, the Court denies IMS's request for attorney fees. 
discovery involves a subpoena and a 30(b)(6) deposition directed to Th1S seeking information 
about (1) the business model/plan of IMS to determine if it has acted as a medical provider or as 
a finance company in this case; (2) the factual foundation for the estimated costs of surgery 
provided to the Plaintiffs by IMS to detennine if the estimate represents reasonable and 
customary medical expenses or collateral source evidence about how the Plaintiffs intend to pay 
for their medical expenses; and (3) the contractual and financial relationship between IMS and 
Dr. Huntsman who provided causation opinions and surgical recommendations at the request of 
IMS and who has been designated as a "retained expert" by the Plaintiffs to testify concerning 
causation, surgical necessity and reasonable and customary charges for medical treatment. 
There is no claim that the disputed discovery involves privileged material. Therefore, the 
question is whether the disputed discovery involves material which is relevant to a claim or 
defense and is proportional. The collateral source doctrine does not render the disputed 
discovery irrelevant. IMS is arguably a collateral source because it is a financial services 
company which provides litigants like the Plaintiffs in this case with a method to pay for the 
surgery recommended by Dr. Huntsman. IMS, however, argues that it is also a medical service 
provider which contracts with third parties to provide the place and personnel to perform the 
surgery recommended by Dr. Huntsman. This dispute about the role IMS plays makes the IMS 
business model/plan and factual foundation for the cost estimate IMS provided to the Plaintiffs 
relevant and discoverable. The collateral source doctrine does not bar the disputed discovery 
because there is a dispute whether the cost estimate is a collateral source or is evidence of 
reasonable and customary charges for medical services. 
IMS further argues that even if the requested discovery is relevant it is not proportional 
because IMS is a non-party. The party seeking discovery always bears the burden of showing 
proportionality. 
By its own arguments, IMS occupies multiple roles in this case, including acting as a 
medical services facilitator which arranged for the Plaintiffs to be examined by Dr. Huntsman to 
determine if causation and surgical necessity existed and as a potential financial provider which 
would finance the surgery recommended by Dr. Huntsman. It is also important that Dr. 
Huntsman has agreed to act as a retained expert in this case to testify on causation, medical 
necessity and reasonable and custo~ charges for medical treatment. Considering the needs of 
this case, the requested discovery is reasonable to determine the factual foundation for the IMS 
estimate of surgery and to explore the financial relationship between IMS and Dr. Huntsman. 
This is because it was IMS that connected the Plaintiffs with Plaintiffs' retained expert, Dr. 
Huntsman. 
The information sought is accessible and available to IMS from its own business records 
and the burden or expense of providing the requested information is not excessive. Discovery of 
this information will facilitate a pre-trial determination of collateral source evidence and bias. 
The information sought is not cumulative or duplicative of other information already produced in 
this case. The information sought by subpoena and 30(b)(6) deposition is within the control of 
IMS and the information sought cannot be obtained from another source that is more convenient 
and less burdensome or less expensive. The Defendants have been denied the opportunity to 
obtain this information to date because of the limited response by IMS to a subpoena and 
because oflMS's refusal to appear at a scheduled 30(b)(6) deposition. Therefore, the discovery 
is proportional. 
Accordingly, the Court orders that, in addition to the records and documents already 
produced in response to the subpoena served on IMS, IMS shall designate and produce a 
30(b)(6) witness or witnesses who can testify about the matters described below at a time and 
place to be determined by the parties and non-parties. Furthermore, IMS shall produce in 
advance of the 30(b )( 6) deposition documents and tangible things in its possession and control 
which document or form the basis for answering the matters on which the witness is being 
produced for examination pursuant to rule 30(b)(6): 
1. All business licenses issued to Intennountain Surgical, LLC to operate an ambulatory 
surgical facility from December 18, 2014 to present; 
2. All licenses issued by the Utah Department of Health to Intermountain Surgical, LLC to 
operate an ambulatory surgical facility from December 18, 2014 to present; 
3. All accreditations issued to Intermountain Surgical, LLC in connection with its operation 
of an ambulatory surgical facility from December 18, 2014 to present; 
4. The number of surgeries Dr. Huntsman performed in 2016 for which he or his business 
entity was paid by Intennountain Surgical, LLC; 
5. The total fees IMS paid Dr. Huntsman in 2016 to perform surgeries for clients 
Intermountain Surgical, LLC referred to Dr. Huntsman for surgical evaluations; 
6. When, how, and by whom Esther Buenrostro was referred to lntermountain Surgical, 
LLC to obtain the surgical cost estimate dated December 18, 2014; 
7. When, how, and by whom Ignacio Bu Buenrostro was referred to Intermountain Surgical, 
LLC to obtain the surgical cost estimate dated December 18, 2014; 
8. All data, documentation or other information relied upon by Intermountain Surgical, LLC 
to prepare the surgical cost estimate dated December 18, 2014 for Esther Buenrostro; 
9. All data, documentation or other· information relied upon by Intermountain Surgical, LLC 
to prepare the surgical cost estimate dated December 18, 2014 for Ignacio Buenrostro; 
1 0. The identity and expert qualifications of any employee, agent or representative of 
Intermountain Surgical, LLC who intends to testify as an expert in this litigation to 
establish that the surgical cost estimate dated December 18, 2014 for Ignacio Buenrostro 
represents usual, customary and reasonable charges for the community where the services 
were provided and the surgery was performed; 
11. The identity and expert qualifications of any employee, agent or representative of 
lntermountain Surgical, LLC who intends to testify as an expert in this litigation to 
establish that the surgical cost estimate dated December 18, 2014 for Esther Buenrostro 
represents usual, customary and reasonable charges for the community where the services 
were provided and the surgery was performed; 
12. All data, documentation, or other information relied upon by Intermountain Surgical, 
LLC to establish that the surgical cost estimate dated December 18, 2014 for Esther 
Buenrostro represents usual, customary and reasonable charges for the community, 
including but not limited to data, documentation and information from ConsulMed, LLC 
and/or FAIR Health, Inc. and/or other consultants; 
13. All data, documentation, or other information relied upon by Intermountain Surgical, 
LLC to establish that the surgical cost estimate dated December 18, 2014 for Ignacio 
Buenrostro represents usual, customary and reasonable charges for the community, 
including but not limited to data, documentation and information from ConsuIMed, LLC 
and/or FAIR Health, Inc. and/or other consultants; 
14. The portion of the Intermountain Surgical, LLC surgical cost estimate dated December 
18, 2014 for Ignacio Buenrostro that represents profit, interest, finance charge, risk of 
capital loss, or similar exposure; 
15. The portion of the Intermountain Surgical, LLC surgical cost estimate dated December 
18, 2014 for Esther Buenrostro that represents profit, interest, finance charge, risk of 
capital loss, or similar exposure; 
16. The identity of all documents contained in the file maintained by Intermountain Surgical, 
LLC for Ignacio Buenrostro; 
17. The identity of all docwnents contained in the file maintained by Intermountain Surgical, 
LLC for Esther Buenrostro. 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, IMS's request for a Protective Order with respect to the 
use of information and materials this Court may require IMS to produce herein is granted as 
follows: 
1. The information that IMS is required to produce pursuant to this Order will be deemed 
confidential, private and protected and shall be used solely for the purpose of conducting 
this litigation and not for any other purpose whatsoever. To be subject to the protections 
of this Protective Order, IMS, Canyon Crest, and Huntsman shall designate the 
documents as "Confidential" or "Private." 
2. None of the documents, materials, items, or information produced by IMS, subsequent to 
the date of this Order shall be distributed outside of or leave the possession of the 
attorneys in this litigation without prior order of the Court. If a party wishes to disclose 
any of the documents referenced herein, that party must file a motion with the Court. 
3. All documents, materials, items, or information referenced herein shall be designated as 
"CONFIDENTIAL" or "PRIVATE" if filed with the Court and shall be filed in a sealed 
envelope with the notation thereon that the contents are filed pursuant to this Protective 
Order and that the envelope shall not be opened or its contents disclosed ( other than to 
the Court in-camera) until an Order of the Court is entered after notice to the parties and 
non-parties. 
4. Nothing in this Protective Order shall be deemed to preclude any party or non-party from 
seeking and obtaining additional protection from the Court regarding the treatment of 
documents or other material covered by this Order. 
5. Within sixty (60) days after the termination of this action, each party shall assemble all 
documents, materials, items, or information referenced herein and shall either (i) return 
such documents and things and all copies thereof to ™S, or (ii) destroy the documents 
and things and all copies thereof and provide written certification of such destruction to 
IMS. 
So Ordered this ? ) day of May, 2017. 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following 
people for case 160902137 by the method and on the date specified. 
EMAIL: BRETT R BOULTON brett@fsutah.com 
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EMAIL: 
Date: 
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Addendum 2 
Decision and Order 
Vigueras-Amezcua v. Shoeman 
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IN THE TIIlRD ruDICIAL DISCTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAVIER VIGUERAS-AMEZCUA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NOAH SHOEMAN, 
Defendant. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Case No. 160903969 
Judge: Matthew Bates 
This matter came on for hearing on Thursday, December 8, 2016, on Plaintiffs 
Statement of Discovery Issues and the Motion for Protective Order filed by the non-parties, 
January 11, 2017 01 :49 PM 1 of 8 
lntermountain Surgical, LLC ("IMS"), Canyon Crest Surgical II, LLC ("Canyon Crest'') and Salt 
Lake Orthopedic Center/Dr. Kade Huntsman ("Huntsman"). Plaintiff was represented by 
Jordan P. Kendall of Eisenberg, Gilchrist & Cutt; Defendant was represented by Gary L. Cooper 
of Cooper & Larsen; and the non-parties were represented by Scott Evans of Christensen & 
Jensen. 
The Court read the submissions by the parties and the non-parties, heard oral 
arguments and after considering the submissions, the case law and the arguments, the Court 
grants in part and denies in part, the Plaintiffs Statement of Discovery Issues and the Motion for 
Protective Order filed by the non-parties as detailed below. 
Ut. R. Civ. P. 26{b) allows discovery of "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to 
a claim or defense of any party if the discovery satisfies the standards of proportionality .... " 
Neither the parties nor the non-parties claim that the disputed discovery involves privileged 
material. Therefore, the question before the court is whether the disputed discovery involves 
material which is relevant to a claim or defense and is proportional. The Plaintiff and the non-
parties have argued that the discovery is not relevant and the non-parties have argued that the 
disputed discovery is not proportional. The Defendant has argued that the disputed discovery is 
not prohibited by the collateral source rule, is relevant and is proportional under the Ut. R. Civ. P. 
26 standards. 
The collateral source doctrine states that a tort feasor may not reduce his damages by 
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the amount that a plaintiff receives from collateral sources. In that sense, IMS is a collateral 
source because it provides a benefit to the plaintiff and provides a way for the plaintiff to pay 
for the costs he has incurred. The most primary collateral source evidence here is the evidence 
of a financial relationship between IMS and the Plaintiff in this case and has already been 
disclosed. This is the collateral source evidence that should not come in at trial when we get 
there, because the jury does not need to know or should know about whatever the financial 
arrangement is between IMS and the Plaintiff, whether that bill will ever be paid, whether it is 
paid in installments, whether interest is accruing or not and the fact that IMS has a lien on any 
judgment that may be obtained so that IMS can get its money back. The collateral source rule 
does not by itself bar the discovery requested at this stage of the litigation. 
Even though in its financial disclosure it seems to say that they are not a medical 
provider, IMS appears to have multiple roles. One of the roles is to provide medical services or 
at least coordinate medical services, and the other is to provide financial services. Therefore, 
while IMS is a collateral source, IMS is also a medical provider. In determining whether 
requested discovery is proportional the court must weigh the fact that IMS has multiple roles in 
this case. IMS has represented that it leases a surgical suite from canyon Crest and owns the 
equipment in the surgical space. There is some evidence that IMS is augmenting or making the 
Statement of Account allegedly higher than what was charged by the providers to account for 
the fact that it is covering the Plaintiffs bills and providing essentially a collateral source for him. 
With this understanding the court will allow the defense to get behind that initial bill and look a 
January 11, 2017 01 :49 PM 
little bit deeper. Essentially, the Court is ordering the non-parties to basically turn over their file 
as it pertains to Mr. Javier Vigueras-Amezcua. The Defendant is entitled to at least look at the 
costs that IMS incurred in coordinating those services for the Plaintiff. However, the court will 
not require IMS to provide invoices for any medical surgical supplies or DME supplies. These 
are items that are commonly used by many medical providers and there is plenty of 
information available to Defendant about the cost of these items generally. 
Defendant's request for discovery into the tax information and payments by or to non-
parties like IMS, Huntsman and Canyon Crest is beyond what is pertinent to the Plaintiff in this 
case, and imposes a burden on non-parties that is not proportional under Ut. R. Civ. P. 26. In 
addition, Dr. Huntsman has already submitted an Affidavit in which he denies a financial 
interest in IMS and/or Canyon Crest. If the defense can later on get some evidence to show 
that there is some financial relationship beyond just being a doctor and an independent 
contractor, the Court will absolutely reconsider this. Therefore, Defendant's request for tax 
information and payments by or to the non-parties is denied for now. 
The court now turns to the specific subpoenas served upon the non-parties by the 
Defendants. In addition to the records and documents already produced in response to those 
subpoenas, the non-parties shall produce the following documents: 
I. Canyon Crest Surgical II, LLC ("Canyon Crest") shall produce the following in response 
to the subpoena served by the defense: 
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• The Canyon Crest Surgical Center invoice/bill for the facility charge for the Two 
Level Anterior Cervical Disc Fusion (ACDF) performed on Javier Vigueras-
Amezcua at Canyon Crest Surgical Center on January 16, 2016; 
• The form used in 2015 by Canyon Crest MedicaVCanyon Crest Surgical Center 
to disclose to patients about the ownership or investment by Salt Lake 
Orthopedic Clinic and/or Dr. Kade T. Huntsman in Canyon Crest 
Medical/Canyon Crest Surgical Center; 
• The form used in 2016 by Canyon Crest Medical/Canyon Crest Surgical Center 
to disclose to patients about the ownership or investment by Salt Lake 
Orthopedic Clinic and/or Dr. Kade T. Huntsman in Canyon Crest 
Medical/Canyon Crest Surgical Center; 
• The form used in 2015 by Canyon Crest MedicaVCanyon Crest Surgical Center 
to disclose to patients about the relationship with the manufacturer(s)/supplier(s) 
of the Surgical Implants/Supplies used in the Two Level Anterior Cervical Disc 
Fusion (ACDF) performed on Javier Vigueras-Amezcua at Canyon Crest 
Surgical Center on January 16, 2016; 
• The form used in 2016 by Canyon Crest MedicaVCanyon Crest Surgical Center 
to disclose to patients about the relationship with the manufacturer(s)/supplier(s) 
of the Surgical Implants/Supplies used in the Two Level Anterior Cervical Disc 
Fusion (ACDF) performed on Javier Vigueras-Amezcua at Canyon Crest 
January 11, 2017 01:49 PM 5 of 8 
Surgical Center on January 16, 2016; and 
• All licenses which were in force and which had been issued to Canyon Cr~st 
Surgical Center by any regulating entity at the time the Two Level Anterior 
Cervical Disc Fusion (ACDF) was performed on Javier Vigueras-Amezcua at 
Canyon Crest Surgical Center on January 16, 2016. 
2. Salt Lake Orthopedic Center/Dr. Kade Huntsman ("Huntsman") shall produce the 
following in response to the subpoena served by the defense: 
• The Salt Lake Orthopedic Clinic/Dr. Kade T. Huntsman invoice/bill for Dr. 
Huntsman's professional services for the Two Level Anterior Cervical Disc 
Fusion (ACDF) performed on Javier Vigueras-Amezcua at Canyon Crest 
Surgical Center on January 16, 2016, and all pre- and post-surgical 
treatment; 
• The form used in 2015 by Salt Lake Orthopedic Clinic and/or Dr. Kade T. 
Huntsman to disclose to patients about the ownership of or investment 
in lntermountain Surgical, LLC: and 
• The form used in 2016 by Salt Lake Orthopedic Clinic and/or Dr. Kade T. 
Huntsman to disclose to patients about the ownership of or investment 
in lntermountain Surgical, LLC. 
3. Intermountain Surgical, LLC ("IMS") shall produce the following in response to 
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the subpoena served by the defense: 
• The Canyon Crest Surgical Center invoice/bill for the facility charge for 
the Two Level Anterior Cervical Disc Fusion (ACDF) performed on 
Javier Vigueras-Amezcua at Canyon Crest Surgical Center on January 16, 
2016; 
• The Salt Lake Orthopedic Clinic/Dr. Kade T. Huntsman invoice/bill for 
Dr. Huntsman's professional services for the Two Level Anterior Cervical 
Disc Fusion (ACDF) performed on Javier Vigueras-Amezcua at Canyon 
Crest Surgical Center on January 16, 2016 
• The Anesthesiologist invoice/bill for the anesthesia services provided for 
the Two Level Anterior Cervical Disc Fusion (ACDF) performed on 
Javier Vigueras-Amezcua at Canyon Crest Surgical Center on January 16, 
2016; 
• The Physicians Assistant invoice/bill for the Physician Assistant services 
provided for the Two Level Anterior Cervical Disc Fusion (ACDF) 
performed on Javier Vigueras-Amezcua at Canyon Crest Surgical Center 
on January 16, 2016; and 
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• The invoice/bill for any medical services or supplies paid by 
Intermountain Surgical, LLC for treatment provided to Javier Vigueras-
Amezcua. However, the Court will not require IMS to provide invoices 
for any of the medical surgical supplies or DME supplies. 
Production of the rest and remainder of the documents and material requested by the 
defense in the subpoenas is denied without further order by the Court. The defense shall pay 
reasonable copy costs for the documents produced by the non-parties. All documents not 
previously produced, but produced in response to this Order shall not be shared or 
communicated to anyone outside of personnel in the law offices defending the Defendant 
without further order of the Court. Counsel for the non-parties shall prepare an appropriate 
protective order consistent with the oral pronouncement of the order of the Court. 
The order is entered by the Court as evidenced by the dated electronic signature at the 
top of this document 
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IN THE 11IlRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
JA VlER VIGUERAS-AMEZCUA, 
Plaintiff: 
vs. 
NOAH SHOEMAN, 
Defendant. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Case No.: 160903969 
Judge Matthew Bates 
This matter came on for hearing on Thursday, December 8, 2016, on Plaintiff's Statement 
of Discovery Issues and the Motion for Protective Order filed by the non-parties, Intermountain 
Surgica~ LLC ("IMS"), Canyon Crest Surgical II, LLC ("Canyon Crest") and Salt Lake 
Orthopedic Center/Dr. Kade Huntsman (''Huntsman"). Plaintiff was represented by Jordan P. 
Kendell of Eisenberg, Gilchrist & Cutt; Defendant was represented by Gary L. Cooper of Cooper 
& Larsen; and the non-parties were represented by Scott Evans of Christensen & Jensen. 
The Court read the submissions by the parties and the non-parties, heard oral arguments 
and after considering the submissions, the case law and the arguments, the Court grants the non-
parties' Motion for Protective Order as follows: 
January 16, 2017 12:56 PM 1 of 5 
I. This Order applies to all documents, materials, items, or information produced pursuant to 
this Court's order and after December 8, 2016, whether in tangible or electronic form, such as 
electro-magnetic storage and computer storage disks or other electronic media, which is produced 
by IMS, Canyon Crest, and Huntsman pursuant to subpoenas served by Defendant in this litigation 
are deemed confidential, private and protected and shall be used solely for the purpose of 
conducting this litigation and not for any business or other purpose whatsoever. 
2. To be subject to the protections of this order, IMS, Canyon Crest, and Huntsman shall 
designate the documents as "Confidential" or ''Private". 
3. None of the documents, materials, items, or information produced by IMS, Canyon Crest, 
and Huntsman pursuant to subpoenas served by Defendant in this litigation shall be distributed 
outside of or leave the possession of the attorneys in this litigation without prior order of the Court. 
If a party wishes to disclose any of the documents referenced herein, that party must file a motion 
with the Court. 
4. All documents, materials, items, or information referenced herein shall be designated as 
"CONFIDENTIAL" or "PRIVATE" if filed with the Court and shall be filed in a sealed envelope 
with the notation thereon that the contents are filed pursuant to this Order and that the envelope 
shall not be opened or its contents disclosed ( other than to the Court in camera) until an Order of the 
Court is entered after notice to the parties. 
5. Nothing in this Order shall be deemed to preclude any party or non-party from seeking 
and obtaining additional protection from the Court on the treatment of documents or other material 
covered by this Order. 
6. Within sixty (60) days after the termination of this action, each party shall assemble all 
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documents, materials, items, or information referenced herein and shall either (i) return such 
documents and things and all copies thereof to the IMS, Canyon Crest, and Huntsman, or (ii) 
destroy the documents and things and all copies thereof and provide written certification of such 
destruction to the IMS, Canyon Crest, and Huntsman. 
In accordance with the Utah State District Courts Ejiling Standard No. 4, and URCP Rule 1 0(e), 
this Order does not bear the handwritten signature of the Judge, but instead displays an 
electronic signature at the upper right-hand corner of the first page of this Order. 
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Approved as to form this 12th day ofJanuary, 2017. 
EISENBERG, GILCHRIST & CUTI 
Isl Jordan P. Kendall signed w permission 
Jordan P. Kendall 
jkendell@ecglegal.com 
Approved as to form this 12th day of January, 2017. 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
Isl Gary L. Cooper signed w permission 
Gary L. Cooper 
gary@cooper-larsen.com 
Approved as to form this 12th day ofJanuary, 2017. 
PETERSEN & ASSOCIATES 
January 16, 2017 12:56 PM 4 of 5 
Isl Lloyd R.. Jones signed w permission 
Lloyd R.. Jones 
Lloyd.jones@farmers.com 
Approved as to form this 12th day of January, 2017. 
CHRISTENSEN & IBNSEN, P.C. 
Isl Scott T. Evans 
Scott T. Evans 
Scott.evans@chrisjen.com 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
RAMBEAU SALISBURY, 
Plaintiff: 
vs. 
THE LNING PLANET, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, DBA THE LIVING PLANET 
AQUARIUM; and JOHN DOE, an individual, 
Defendant. 
INTERMOUNTAIN SURGICAL'S 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Case No.: 130905519 
Judge Laura Scott 
Intermountain Surgical, LLC (hereinafter "IMS") and Canyon Crest Surgical II, LLC 
(hereinafter Canyon Crest) filed a joint Motion for Protective Order with respect to Defendant's 
requests for 30(b)(6) depositions of IMS and Canyon Crest. The motion was fully briefed and heard 
on August 11, 2015 before the Honorable Laura Scott. Peter L. Mifflin appeared on behalf of 
Plaintiff Rambeau Salisbury, Paul M. Belnap of Strong and Hanni appeared on behalf of Defendant 
The Living Planet, Inc., and Karra J. Porter and Scott T. Evans of Christensen & Jensen appeared on 
behalf of Intermountain Surgical, LLC. 
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Having already responded to Defendant's request to produce documents, IMS and Canyon 
Crest objected to Defendant's taking of the 30(b)(6) depositions as well as the scope of the 30(b)(6) 
Notices and Subpoenas Duces Tecum served on IMS and Canyon Crest. Judge Scott, after hearing 
argument from counsel, and being fully advised, 
ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows: 
1. The Court hereby grants the Motion for Protective Order filed by IM:S and Canyon Crest. 
2. The Court finds the business relationship between IMS and Canyon Crest is not relevant to 
the ultimate issue, which is whether the charges from IM:S to the Plaintiff are customary and 
reasonable. Defendant is not permitted to perform discovery or make further inquiry into the 
business relationship between IMS and Canyon Crest. Likewise, Defendant is not permitted 
to perform discovery on the issue of IMS' s markup or profit margin in relation to what their 
vendors charge for products or services. 
3. Subject to paragraph 2 of this order, Defendant will be allowed to take the 30(b)(6) 
deposition of Canyon Crest, if it so chooses. 
4. Subject to paragraph 2 of this order, Defendant will be allowed to take the 30(b)(6) 
deposition of IMS concerning the billings rendered with respect to the above Plaintiff and 
concerning information that would typically be provided in a medical bill from a similarly 
situated medical billing provider to a similarly situated patient to the extent not already 
provided. 
5. Any pricing analysis that IMS or Canyon Crest has performed, or continues to perform, are 
confidential and proprietary trade secrets which are not subject to discovery. This 
information is also irrelevant to the ultimate issue, which is whether Th1S' s charges to the 
Plaintiff are customary and reasonable. 
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6. IMS's and Canyon Crest's request that the information they produce pursuant to Defendant's 
subpoenas be deemed confidential is granted. The information that has been produced and 
which may be produced is confidential and shall not be used for any purpose outside of the 
above captioned litigation. 
7. The request for attorney fees associated with this motion has been withdrawn. Therefore, 
attorney fees are not awarded 
-------END OF ORDER--------
In accordance with the Utah State District Courts Ejiling Standard No. 4, and URCP Rule l0(e), 
this Order does not bear the handwritten signature of the Judge, but instead displays an 
electronic signature at the upper right-hand corner of the first page of this Order. 
Approved as to form this 11th day of 
December, 2015. 
ls/Paul M Belnap, signed with permission 
Paul M. Belnap 
Nicholas E. Dudoich 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for The Living Planet 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 11th day of December, 2015, I electronically filed the foregoing 
INTERMOUNTAIN SURGICAL'S PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
PROTECTIVE ORDER with the Clerk of the Court using the efiling system, which sent 
notification of such filing to the following: 
Paul M. Belnap 
Nicholas E. Dudoich 
STRONG & HANNI 
102 South 200 East, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Rambeau Salisbury 
8638 West Park Street 
Copperton, Utah 84026 
December 141 2015 10:29 AM 
Via US Mail 
Isl Judy Garrett, Secretary 
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